ABSTRACT A common mental model sees lobbies pushing policy in a certain direction from the status quo with a certain force, the outcome being a function of how hard lobbies push and in what direction, according to the`parallelogram of political forces' at work. When this model is formalized and lobbies are seen as playing a game in which they are attempting to maximize their payoffs, net of lobbying costs, the prediction is that lobbies seldom if ever will push in the direction of what they ideally want, for their lobbying will partly aim to offset the efforts of others, leading to waste of resource. There will often appear to be more con¯ict of interest between two lobbies than actually is the case. This calls into question methodologies for studying and for measuring power that assume that we can infer groups' preferences from their lobbying behaviour. From observing their behaviour we can infer things about their power if we know their preferences or we can infer things about their preferences if we know their power. But it is not possible to make both inferences.
For many years a simple mental model has been used to think about the way in which interest groups (lobbies) can change policy. The pressure model relies on a physical analogy: lobbies push the outcome in a certain direction from the status quo with a certain force; the outcome is a function of how hard lobbies push and in what direction, according to the`parallelogram of political forces' at work. Here policy is represented as a point in an issue space, while a lobby's efforts are represented by a vector that points in a certain direction from the origin, representing the status quo, and that has a certain magnitude, representing how hard the lobby is pushing.
In its original form the pressure model does not allow for strategic interdependence of decision-making but lobbies are playing a game in which their lobbying vectors are chosen so as to maximize their payoffs, net of lobbying costs. 1 In my version of the pressure model lobbies' best strategies typically depend on what other lobbies do, not just on their preferred outcomes. We should not expect lobbies to press for what they ideally want, because much of their effort will be directed at offsetting others' efforts. If lobbying power is the ability to change counterfactual outcomes in the direction of what a lobby ideally wants, we cannot measure its power merely by observing how successful it is in getting what it asks for, for this may not correspond with what it ideally wants.
The idea that policy change is along the resultant of group pressure is often traced to Bentley (1935) , although it is more explicit in the work of later pluralists like Truman (1964: 507) and Latham (1952: 390±1) . The image of pressure politics may seem tied to the limited viewpoint of pluralism.
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Yet the ability to win out against opponents in open political con¯ict is hardly to be ignored, even if it does not constitute the whole domain of power. Some may see the pressure model as superseded by more sophisticated game-theoretical accounts of lobbying that clarify the mechanisms of resource and information transfer at work. 3 However, I show that it is possible to give an explicit account of how in¯uence is exerted that is consistent with the pressure model. This suggests certain limitations to its application; but where it applies we can expect to encounter the sorts of apparently puzzling behaviour and measurement dif®culties that the model highlights. First I de®ne the pressure model ®rst, then derive some of its implications.
The Vector Lobbying Game
Lobbying takes place in a policy space, represented as a real space with dimensionality m; m ! 1. There are n lobbies labelled 1; 2; . . . ; I; . . . ; N.
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The notational convention will be to denote vectors in bold-face italic type. Points in space, such as outcomes, will generally be represented by vectors written using upper-case letters. Lobbying strategies will be vectors in lower-case letters representing the direction and the amount of pressure exerted. Thus lobby I 's strategy is denoted by i. The status quo policy is the origin of the policy space, 0.
Lobbies simultaneously choose lobbying strategies. The outcome of the lobbying process, X, is the vector-sum of the lobbying vectors, i.e.
This is illustrated for the case of two dimensions and two lobbies A and B in Figure 1 . Note the`parallelogram of forces' construction to get X. Lobby I has a utility function over the policy space, u I ( . ), giving rise to a unique ideal point at which its utility is maximized, I, such that its utility is a strictly decreasing function of either the simple Euclidean distance (s.E.d.) or the weighted Euclidean distance (w.E.d.) between I and any other point, K (Hinich and Munger, 1997: 73±89) . Using an obvious notation, for lobby I, sEd I I; K jI À Kj the length of the vector I À K, being the straight line distance between the two policies. Also
where A I is an (m Â m) matrix such that A I is not a positive scalar multiple of the identity matrix (or w.E.d. is in effect the same as s.E.d.); and entries on the leading diagonal of A I are strictly positive (implying that I gives positive weight to each policy dimension when calculating distance). Lobby I has a cost function for lobbying, c I jij, with strictly positive ®rst derivative with respect to jij, the length (modulus) of its lobbying vector, representing the effort it puts into lobbying. Lobby I aims to maximize u I X À c I jij subject to the constraint that jij I ; I > 0, where I represents the resource constraint on its lobbying.
The solution concept is Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium outcomes and lobbying vectors are starred thus, X Ã and i Ã .
The Division Principle
In order to illustrate my argument it is easiest to start with the case of two lobbies and a single issue dimension. If the two sides' ideal points were on opposite sides of the status quo they would lobby in the direction of their ideal point in equilibrium, if they lobbied at all; but this need not be so otherwise, as illustrated in Figure 2 . A and B have ideal points located to the right of the status quo. Yet A may lobby against such change. This is because it wishes to offset the efforts of B, which would otherwise push things beyond what it wanted. Also B exaggerates, pushing for more change than it actually wants, because it makes allowance for what A is doing. There appears to be more con¯ict of interest between the two sides than is actually the case. It is because X Ã is to the right of A that A must lobby to the left in equilibrium, if it lobbies at all: if it lobbied to the right, it would push the outcome even further away from its ideal point. Note that it is not A's position in relation to the status quo that determines whether it lobbies positively or negatively. So far I have assumed that equilibria like that shown in Figure 2 are possible. I give a numerical example in footnote 10.
I now generalize the argument that Figure 2 illustrates ± what I call the division principle. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium with n ! 2 lobbies and m ! 1 dimensions. The equilibrium lobbying vectors of the groups are the sum of their projections onto the issue dimensions. Consider any issue dimension, say the d th. Because preferences are either based on s.E.d. or on w.E.d., I's induced preferences on the d th dimension are single-peaked with a unique induced optimum, denoted by I d . Let the projection of X Ã onto the dth dimension be denoted by X Ã d and the projection of I's equilibrium strategy onto the d th dimension be denoted by i Ã d . Then the division principle states that for any lobby I such that 
5 In words, if I's ideal point is to the left of the equilibrium it must lobby in a negative direction if it lobbies at all on the dth dimension; while if its ideal point is to the right of the equilibrium it must lobby in a positive direction, if it lobbies. The proof is immediate. Taking the ®rst part, if
by keeping the components of its strategy on all other dimensions the same and reducing the amount it spent on lobbying positively on the d th dimension, I could get a better outcome at lower cost, contradicting the assumption that X Ã is an equilibrium. Suppose there exists a dimension d for which lobby I's induced ideal point is between the status quo and the projection of the equilibrium outcome on to that dimension, i.e.
Then, by the division principle, if I lobbies on the d th dimension it must do so in the opposite direction from the status quo compared to that of its induced ideal point, i.e. the dth component of its strategy, i Ã d , will have the opposite sign to I d . With no utility interaction between the issue dimensions, I's induced ideal point on the d th dimension will be the same as the d th component of I, as its induced ideal point is not conditional on the outcome on other dimensions (Hinich and Munger, 1997 83±6) . 6 Then overall I will not lobby in the direction of its ideal point, i.e. it is not the case that i k Á I for k > 0.
Using a very general speci®cation of preferences the division principle establishes that there may exist lobbies such that what they press for is not what they ideally want. I now go on to show that this problem is endemic with s.E.d. preferences.
A Necessary Condition on Best Reply Functions with
Preferences Based on s.E.d.
A lobby's preferences are based on s.E.d. if utility is a strictly decreasing function of the straight line distance between the outcome and the lobby's ideal point. The utility function re¯ects that issues are equally salient and a lobby's ideal policy on any dimension is independent of the outcome on any other dimension (Hinich and Munger, 1997: 73±89) . With s.E.d. preferences in a two-dimensional policy space I has circular indifference curves over outcomes, centred on its ideal point.
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WARD: PLEASURE POLITICS 35 5. At this stage I make no claims about the existence or uniqueness of equilibria. However this result, and subsequent ones in Sections 3±5, hold for any equilibria that do exist.
6. That is with separable preferences. With w.E d., lobby I 's preferences are separable if the entries in A I off the leading diagonal are zero.
7. In contrast to w.E.d. preferences where the more complex metric gives rise in the twodimensional case to`elliptical' indifference curves, possibly with axes tilted in relation to the issue dimensions. Strictly for ellipses it is required that A I is symmetric and (a 11 Â a 22 À a 12 Â a 21 > 0 (Hinich and Munger, 1997: 216) . If I's lobbying vector was the null vector 0, say that it does not lobby. In this instance the outcome would be
I 's best reply function must be of the general form i Ã X Ài k I X Ài ; II À X Ài , where k I X Ài ; I is a scalar function of vectors such that 0 k I : ; : 1 and jk I X Ài ; I I À X Ài j I . Here the direction of I's best reply is the same as that of the vector I À X Ài but its magnitude will be smaller by factor of proportionality k I X Ài ; I . By lobbying along I À X Ài within these constraints, I pushes the outcome along the line X X Ài I À X Ài from X Ài towards I; and this is the locus of points at given distance from X Ài that is closest to I. I would never push the outcome along this line beyond I; hence, 0 k I : ; : 1; and it can never use more than its available resources; hence, jk I X Ài ; II À X Ài j t i . The length of I 's lobbying vector will depend on the cost function and the gains in payoff to be made as the outcome is pushed nearer I. Figure 3 shows an indifference curve centred on A's ideal point A as a dotted circle. The points at the same distance as X from X Ài b, shown as a full circular arc through X, are ones that A can achieve at the same cost as X. Among these X is the nearest to A. X must be at a point of tangency between a circular indifference curve and a circle 
. Preferences
Suppose there are two lobbies, A and B, and the issue space is twodimensional. Furthermore, suppose that the ideal points of the two lobbies, A and B, are not collinear and neither lobby's ideal point is at the origin. Then, if both sides lobby in equilibrium, neither side pushes towards what it ideally wants. According to the necessary condition on best replies in equilibrium, the following pair of equations must simultaneously be satis®ed for some k A and k B :
for some k A ; k B such that 1 ! k A ; k B ! 0, where a Ã and b Ã are equilibrium lobbying vectors. If A and B lobby, neither of their lobbying vectors are the null vector 0; hence, k A ; k B > 0. So we have 1 ! k A ; k B > 0. For an equilibrium it cannot be the case that k A k B 1 or else the equations have no solutions when A and B are not collinear, for they would then be inconsistent.
Note that b is the weighted vector-sum of ÀA and B with strictly positive weights; hence, it must lie between ÀA and B and outside the sector de®ned by the internal angle between A and B ± see Figure 4 where the components of b along the vectors ÀA and B are shown. Similarly a lies between ÀB and A. In Figure 4 a vector starting at b parallel to a must point in the direction of A and a vector starting at a parallel to b must point in the direction of B, otherwise the necessary conditions for an equilibrium are not met. Thus neither side lobbies in the direction of its ideal point in equilibrium.
8. With w.E.d. preferences the best reply would bring about outcomes at a point of tangency between a circle centred on X Ài and an indifference curve but the locus of such points is generally not the straight-line segment X Ài 3 I.
A and B subtend an angle , less than 1808. This measures one aspect of the con¯ict of interest between the two lobbies: the smaller is the lower the con¯ict of interest over the direction of change. Note that if we mistakenly assumed that lobbying is in the direction of ideal points, there would appear to be greater con¯ict of interest between the lobbies than actually is the case.
These results can immediately be extended to issues spaces with more than two dimensions. The origin, A and B lie in a plane in n-dimensional space. Take the projection of a and b onto this plane. Clearly exactly the same results hold for these projections as hold in two dimensions.
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These results, together with the division principle, call into question much of the common sense that lies behind empirical studies of decision-making. It has generally been assumed that lobbies push in the direction of the change they ideally want but this need not be so. It has been assumed that members of the`anti' lobby on a unidimensional issue actually are opposed to change, whereas they may be offsetting too much change. Observed conict of interest has been taken as a guide to`real' con¯ict of interest, whereas this will usually not be valid with two opposed lobbies. Results like these do not even depend speci®cally on the pressure model. 10. A variety of alternatives to the pressure model exist, combining issue-space and power (March, 1966: 54±68) , including one in which the outcome is the weighted average of the positions of the two sides, i.e. X w A a w B b, where w A w B 1 and w I ! 0 is an increasing function of the resources I deploys and decreasing function of the resources J deploys. It is easy to see that wherever J locates, I will locate somewhere on the straight line through j and I, on its side of j, though not necessarily between j and I: for any distance I locates away from j and any strictly positive set of weights, this brings the weighted average as near as possible continued on next page
The Inef®ciency of Lobbying with Regard to Lobbies' Interests
Returning to Figure 2 , it is obvious that the same result could have come about at lower cost to each side if they both lobbied along the resultant of the pressure-vectors they apply and split the costs of achieving the same outcome. Whenever there exists two groups lobbying in contrary directions with different magnitudes this is possible. The idea extends immediately to multidimensional cases. Let lobbies' preferences depend on w.E.d. or s.E.d. Let E be any equilibrium in which there exist at least two lobbies, say A and B, having strategies a Ã and b Ã that are not collinear in a policy space of dimension greater than 1. Let a Ã b Ã r. Then the outcome X would be the same if the efforts of A and B were replaced by r. By the triangle inequality, jr j < ja Ã j jb Ã j for vectors a Ã and b Ã that are not collinear. Thus if A and B contracted to lobby along r they could bring about the same outcome at lower cost, since each could lobby less than if they lobby in different directions yet bring about the same outcome, so long as their total lobbying effort summed to jr j. The result is illustrated in Figure 5 .
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continued from previous page to I. Thus, lobbies' equilibrium positions must be on a straight line through I and J. To keep models of I 's optimization problem in deciding where to locate and how much resources to deploy sensible, some internal cost for locating away from the ideal point, such as internal strain in the lobby, must be postulated, or else the lobby could get what it wanted by locating way out' and deploying`next to no' resources. Then because for a given resource deployment, when i is on the straight line between I and j, I can reduce strain by moving along the line towards its ideal and pull the outcome nearer its ideal; so it will locate at or on the opposite side of its ideal to j. Applying this argument to both lobbies, we should typically expect equilibria where the two sides locate on the straight line through their ideal points but not between those ideal points, with exaggeration of con¯ict of interest and offsetting. The result can be applied repeatedly starting with any arbitrary pair of lobbies A and B,`pooling' their efforts, then`pooling' with a third lobby, and so on. The implication is clearly that all lobbies would be better off by pushing in the direction of X and agreeing to split the cost of bringing about X in such a way that each side had to try less hard than in the noncooperative equilibrium. 
d. Preferences
So far the speci®cation has been as general as possible, with no guarantee that equilibrium exists or is unique. By obtaining a closed-form solution in the general case with many lobbies and dimensions, suf®cient conditions for a unique equilibrium can be given, the results in Section 4 can be generalized and uncertainties in measuring power highlighted and identi®ed as relating to the fact that lobbies observed strategies may not reveal their preferences. Obtaining closed-form solutions is dif®cult with w.E.d. preferences but it is easy with s.E.d. preferences, so long as further assumptions are made about costs and utility functions to allow linearization. It will be highly convenient if whatever the outcome would be if I did not lobby and whatever its ideal point, its best reply is to push the outcome a ®xed proportion of the distance between X Ài , and I along the line between them. With s.E.d. preferences best-reply lobbying by I pushes the outcome along the directed line segment X Ài 3 I in the direction of I. Figure 6 treats X Ài as the origin and the directed line segment X Ài 3 I as the x-axis. It shows I's lobbying-costs as function of x, the distance from X Ài . I 's induced utility function over outcomes on this line will be single-peaked with an optimum at I x > 0. Make the standard assumption, consistent with s.E.d. preferences that I's induced utility function is quadratic, U I Àx À I x 2 . Assume that I 's cost function takes the form C I 1 À I x 2 = I ; 0 < I < 1. This cost function exhibits increasing marginal costs: the higher the value of I is, the lower the costs of a particular lobbying effort relative to the gains from pushing the outcome nearer to your ideal point are. As marginal costs are zero at the origin while marginal bene®ts of changing policy are strictly 40 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 16 (1) 11. Inef®ciency with respect to the lobbies' interests need not imply the overall social inef®-ciency. First lobbies' resources may merely be transferred without loss to those they lobby, although competition in rent-seeking uses up rather than transfers resources (Becker, 1983; Grossman and Helpman, 2001: 280±1) . Second, information lobbies transfer may conceivably increase social inef®ciency, although lobbying may also induce socially inef®cient policies such as trade barriers (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Lohmann, 1998) by conveying misleading information.
positive with I T 0, the ®rst-order condition that marginal costs equal marginal bene®ts is suf®cient for optimal lobbying:
Thus, i Ã I I À X Ài , so long as j I I À X Ài j I , i.e. I 's resource constraint does not bite.
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X Ài Ã denotes the outcome derived from some equilibrium X Ã by summing the strategies of all other players but I. In relation to a given decision, a lobby is powerful to the extent to which it has the ability to change outcomes from the counterfactual X Ài Ã in the direction of its ideal policy without incurring high costs, if it chooses to do so. While some are willing to talk of power that is not related to the ability to get what you want, circumlocutions such as negative power' must then be used (Dahl, 1957) . The parameter I represents resource limits while I represents costs. For some purposes it may not be necessarily de®nitionally to link power to the cost of changing outcomes but if costs are not brought in power will be of little use in predicting behaviour (Barry, 1989a: 259±64) . It is necessary to make judgements away from the counterfactual X Ài Ã to distinguish power from luck. Barry (1989b) identi®es luck as arising from having preferences similar to others who have power. Because what other players push for may not be what they want, this may be too simplistic. Luck consists in having a counterfactual outcome when you are`absent' from the game that happens to be near your ideal. The counterfactual could be taken as either: (1) the equilibrium outcome if lobby L was not a player of the game but all other things were the same (cf. Barry, 1989b: 285) ; or (2) the outcome X Ài Ã , as previously de®ned. Generally these are not the same because (1) ignores other lobbies' strategic reactions to what L is doing, whereas these are built into X Ài Ã . Alternatively (1) makes it much harder to construct counterfactuals because it is not possible to rely on other lobbies' observed behaviour. More importantly, it is unsatisfactory as a basis for making judgements about L's power because it assumes away other lobbies' strategic reactions to L and the consequences of these for the outcome, which are part of L's causal impact.
A Closed-form Solution, Given s.E.d. Preferences and the Speci®c Assumptions about Costs and Bene®ts
It is unlikely that a lobby would ®nd it rational to use all its resources in one speci®c context; so assume that resource constraints typically do not bite. Then with the speci®c assumptions about cost and utility functions and n ! 2 lobbies, in equilibrium we have a system of n vector equations in n unknowns:
. .
Splitting ideal point and lobbying vectors into their m components along the axes and treating them as column vectors, the system can be written in matrix form as
where v is an n Â m matrix of lobby vectors, V is an (n Â m) matrix of ideal points, P is an (n Â n) square matrix with zeros along the leading diagonal and ones everywhere else, and K is an (n Â n) matrix with I in the ith row on the leading diagonal and zeros everywhere else. This implies that the equilibrium takes the form:
By inspection the inverse of K is the matrix with on main-diagonal elements 1/ I and off-main-diagonal elements 0. Hence, (K À 1 P) has on-main-diagonal elements 1/ I and off-maindiagonal elements 1. It is easy to ®nd (K À 1 P À 1 using Gaussian elimination through elementary row operations. Note that the existence of (K À 1 P À 1 is suf®cient to show that there exists a unique equilibrium. The following notation is useful:
Then the entry along the main diagonal of (K À 1 P À 1 , in the ith row and the ith column is
This is the weight on lobby I's ideal point I in determining its equilibrium lobbying vector, i Ã . The entry in row j, column i of (
This is the weight that lobby I puts on lobby J 's ideal point J in determining its equilibrium lobbying vector, i Ã . 13 Note that as 0 < I < 1 for all I; > 0. Hence, the weight I puts on any other lobby J 's ideal point is strictly negative.
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13. Note that (K À 1 P À 1 is symmetric around the main diagonal, so that this term is also the weight that lobby J puts of I's ideal point, I, in determining its equilibrium lobbying vector, j Ã .
Thus we can express I's equilibrium lobbying vector as
Under what circumstances will I lobby in the direction of its ideal point when m > 1? That is, under what conditions will I Ã cI for some c > 0 with I T 0 ? From Equation 7 a necessary condition for this is that for some c
i.e. either the vector sum on the right-hand-side of Equation 7 is the nullvector 0 or it is collinear with I. The number of other lobbies beside I is (n À 1). For n À 1 ! m, so long as there exists a subset of these lobbies of size m, say H, such that members' ideal points are linearly independent, there will be some linear combination of the ideal points of members of H collinear with I, because the ideal points of members of H form a set of basis vectors for the policy space. Also if (n À 1 > m, there will be some linear combination of the (n À 1) ideal points of lobbies beside I which is equal to 0, because H is now a proper subset of the (n À 1) lobbies excluding I. However, it would only be a matter of chance if the relevant weights leading to colinearity with I or to the null vector were equal to those on lobby vector J given in Equation 7. Thus we can say that I will`almost never' lobby in the direction of its ideal point if m > 1. It is easy to derive an expression for the outcome of lobbying in equilibrium:
As is strictly positive and 0 < I < 1, X Ã puts strictly positive weight on each lobby's ideal point. Moreover, the larger the value of I is, the greater the weight on I 's ideal point will be in determining the outcome, in line with the idea that I is a measure of I's power. Also as is strictly increasing in J , J T I, the weight put on I's ideal point in determining the outcome falls with the power of other lobbies. As already noted, all other lobbies J put negative weight on I, whereas overall there is a positive weight on I. Thus I must place a positive weight on I in its equilibrium lobbying vector, as would be expected intuitively.
The`Uncertainty Principle' in the Measurement of Lobbies' Power and Preferences
Equation 5 can be solved for K if we know v and V, implying that we can measure one aspect of lobbies' power if we know their preferences and observe their lobbying; or it can be solved for V if we know K and v, implying that we can infer lobbies' preferences from their lobbying if we know certain characteristics of their power. However, to infer K and V from Equation 5 just knowing v is not possible: there are too many unknowns.
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The basic point here does not depend s.E.d. preferences or the speci®c assumptions about cost and utility functions. As the division principle shows, what lobbies push for cannot be assumed to be a guide to what they prefer; and without independent knowledge of their preferences, it is dif®cult to make judgements about the degree to which counterfactual outcomes have been changed in desired directions.
The principle is devastating for methodologies for measuring decision power which`solve' this uncertainty by assuming that what lobbies ask for is what they want. For instance Dahl's (1958) key-decision methodology takes observed positions as a guide to preferences and to disagreement, failing to raise the possibility that strategic behaviour by lobbies results in a slippage between what they want and what they ask for. Dowding (1991; also Dowding et al., 1995) criticizes such approaches on the grounds that in strategic contexts actions do not necessarily indicate preferences, so there is a need for the independent veri®cation of preferences. My approach extends Dowding's argument from simple (2 Â 2) matrix games to spatial games.
The community-power literature still exhibits considerable naivety about apparent preferences. Consider Flyvbjerg's (1998) much lauded community-power study of a transport-planning issue in a Danish city. He goes to great pains to show how actors subverted the rational use of information and principles of communicative rationality, by using their power strategically to manipulate the process, in order to get outcomes conforming to what were apparently their pre-given preferences. Yet he fails to ask whether those apparent preferences were another veil. How much was business' apparent opposition to keeping cars out of the centre of Aalborg an exaggeration designed to offset others' efforts to push the status quo in this direction? Flyvbjerg cites evidence that restrictions on car use actually are good for business. Do we underestimate business' power if we assume that they only got part of what they wanted, based on their apparent preferences? They might actually have preferred an intermediate position, with restrictions on car use that bene®ted them. Problems like this arise continually in the community-power literature.
Despite the uncertainty principle, my model has testable implications. For instance in a federal system where the direction of change from the same status quo is decided at state level, a group's lobbying strategy may vary across cases, because it does not face the same set of other lobbies or because their power varies by state. For the same reason in the European Union we might well see groups adopting different tactics at the national and at the European level.
A Mechanism Underlying the Vector Lobbying Model
In this section I outline one mechanism that is compatible with the model, either with s.E.d. or, often, with w.E.d. preferences. 16 This involves bribing or threatening pivotal legislators (Grossman and Helpman, 2001: 299± 314) . They are seen as having an active role in decision-making, rather than just passively responding to pressure, in the sense that their tendency to veto change, based on electoral concerns or policy preferences, must be bought out. The pressure model turns out to be a linear approximation suitable for modelling changes to the status quo that are`relatively small'. These are the sorts of changes that some pluralists anticipate.
Political institutions often split up multi-dimensional policy spaces, dealing with each dimension separately and, thus, generating structure-induced equilibria where there would otherwise be no stable majorities. Where coalition governments are the norm, ministries control particular issues, and much of the time the minister can command a majority for changes that she is willing to accept, although she has to be careful not to provoke the collapse of the coalition (Laver and Shepsle, 1996; cf. Warwick, 1999) . Similarly in the Westminster-style systems, where one party typically commands a majority, there is strong party discipline, and ministers have the gate-keeping power to control the agenda of the cabinet on`their' issues, they have considerable legislative latitude. I start by examining the simplest case in which only one legislator, the minister, needs to be lobbied.
Consider the possibility of changing the status quo on the dth issue. Recall that X Ã d denotes the projection of the equilibrium outcome onto the d th dimension. Divide the groups into the set d such that the projection of their ideal point onto the d th dimension is strictly greater than X Ã d and the set Àd such that the projection of their ideal point onto the d th dimension is less than X Ã d . Then: 17 Figure 7 shows the ideal point of minister m as Lm d , and m's utility function as U m . I assume that prior to lobbying m's ideal point is the status quo, i.e. Lm d 0. If change is to go through m must at least be indifferent between the status quo and the alternative after side payments. The total side payment m receives is the sum of positive inducements to accept change, b, and penalties imposed for doing so, p.
18 The most change she will vote for is b À p > 0. Note that by the division principle all the members of d would prefer to get a bill through to the right of X Ã d but this is the most progress they can get; and members of Àd would prefer to get a bill to the left of X Ã d but are unable to block change to this extent. Let us suppose that if m is indifferent between the status quo and an alternative package consisting of a bill plus positive and negative side payment s/he will support the bill when this is suggested by a lobby. For instance, we could assume that she get some small cachet from the news coverage that the bill receives. Then in equilibrium: d offers b to m for accepting positive change; Àd says it will penalize her p for doing so; d asks m to propose the most progressive option that she will accept that is better for all the members of d than the status quo, X Ã d ; she does so. The outcome is X Ã d goes through. 19 This is an equilibrium because, by assumption, the amount each lobby is expending is in equilibrium with that of other lobbies; d cannot propose more change; Àd cannot block change to a greater extent; and m cannot gain by refusing to introduce the bill or by voting it down. Because of the assumed shape of m's utility function, the marginal cost of promoting change is C m d 1 and the marginal cost of blocking change is C À d 1 ± see Figure 7 . The
Conclusions
When recast in game-theoretic terms, the vector model of lobbying has a number of interesting, counter-intuitive, and empirically relevant implications, that undercut many of the`folkways' of political science:
. With more than one issue dimension, lobbies typically will not push for change in the direction that they want, and they may not do so even if the issue-space is single dimensional, so lobbying does not reveal preferences. . Because of offsetting, there typically will appear to be more con¯ict of interest between two lobbies than actually exists. . Because of wasteful offsetting, if collusion was possible all lobbies would be better off. . On each dimension, what differentiates the pro and anti change coalitions is not where their ideal points are relative to the status quo but where they are relative to the equilibrium (the division principle). . It is impossible simultaneously to infer from observing what lobbies push for both what they ideally want and how powerful they are (the uncertainty principle).
While the vector model does not apply in all contexts, it seems a reasonable approximation in a number of areas, particularly because of the status quo bias in favour of groups wishing to block`large' changes where institutions carve the policy space up so as to deal with issues separately.
